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COMMENTS
The Right to Die: Who Really Makes
the Decision?
I. Introduction
[Nancy Cruzan]1 has not hugged her mother or gazed out
the window or played with her nieces. She has neither laughed
nor wept, her parents say, or spoken a word. [S]he has lain so
still for so long that her hands have curled into claws; nurses
wedge napkins under her fingers to prevent her nails from pierc-
ing her wrists.'
Nothing is more tragic than the unexpected loss of a young per-
son. The suffering of family and friends is often unbearable. Nancy
Cruzan, like many others, "lost" her life unexpectedly in an automo-
bile accident. However, Nancy's situation was more tragic in that
she did not die as a result of the accident. Instead, Nancy suffered
the loss of all cognitive abilities and fell into a persistent vegetative
state lasting over eight years.3 At the time of the accident, Nancy
1. An automobile accident rendered Nancy Cruzan incompetent in the prime of her life.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision which has sparked so much controversy on
the issue of the "right to die" is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health. The decision
will be one of the focuses of this Comment and Nancy's tragic accident will be discussed at
some length. See infra notes 159-87 and accompanying text.
2. Nancy Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 62.
3. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). The American
Academy of Neurology defines a persistent vegetative state as "a form of eyes-open permanent
unconsciousness in which the patient has periods of wakefulness and physiological sleep/wake
cycles, but at no time is the patient aware of him- or herself or the environment." Position of
the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the
Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 122, 125 (1989).
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was only twenty-five years old. Nancy died at age thirty-two after
having shown no sign of improvement over the eight years she re-
mained in a persistent vegetative state." Nancy was maintained in
the persistent vegetative state by a gastrostomy tube,5 which pro-
vides artificial hydration and nutrition. Had a Missouri court not ap-
proved the withdrawal of that life-sustaining system, she could likely
have remained in the permanent vegetative state for another thirty
years.'
The summer of 1990 marked the first time the United States
Supreme Court issued an opinion specifically addressing an individ-
ual's "right to die."' 7 The case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health8 affected not only the interested parties, but con-
tinues to affect the legal profession, the medical community, state
legislatures and the general public. In Cruzan, the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court 9
and held that a state may require a "clear and convincing" 10 stan-
dard of proof before permitting the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment.1"
The heightened evidentiary standard 2 approved by the Court
appears to be contrary to public sentiment.1 3 The majority of juris-
dictions that have permitted the withdrawal or refusal of life-sus-
4. Gibbs, supra note 2, at 62.
5. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Mass. 1986).
"The [gastrostomy] tube is a pliable silicone tube, about one and one-half feet in
length with two openings at the top. Food enters the larger opening of the G-
tube via plastic tubing, ...which in turn is connected to a plastic bag which
hangs above the level of the patient . (footnotes omitted).
Id.
6. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
7. Rose Gasner, The Unconstitutional Treatment of Nancy Cruzan, 7 N.Y.L SCn. J.
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 6 (1990). "Four previous cases have been denied certiorari but in all other
cases, either the patient's right to have treatment withheld was vindicated or the issue became
moot." Id. (footnote omitted).
8. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
9. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en barc).
10. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
I1. Id.
12. Id.
13. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n.l (N.J. 1987) (finding that 70% of 2,000 persons
who responded via television in a conference on life-sustaining medical treatment at the United
States Chamber of Commerce in 1986 "strongly agreed" that decisions concerning the with-
drawal of life-sustaining medical treatment should be made by ihe family if the patient is
incapable of deciding for themselves); American Medical Association, Public Opinion on
Health Care Issues - 1986 (Chicago 1986) (poll taken of 1,510 individuals found that 73%
favored "withdrawing life support systems, including food and water from hopelessly ill or
irreversible comatose patients if they or their family request it"); Fort Collins Coloradoan,
Sept. 29, 1988 (survey conducted by Colorado University's Graduate School of Public Affairs
indicated that 85% of the respondents would not want to be maintained through artificial
feeding if they became permanently unconscious and could not eat).
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taining medical treatment have refused to employ such a strict stan-
dard.1" In reaching its decision through application of the clear and
convincing standard, the Missouri Supreme Court held that prior
statements made by Nancy to her housemate were too general 5 and
refused to consider testimony presented by her family and closest
friends as to what they believed Nancy would have desired if she was
competent. 16 As a result of the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing, Nancy Cruzan was forced to receive the artificial hydration and
nutrition against the wishes of both her and her family. However,
additional evidence elicited after the United States Supreme Court
decision led a Missouri court, some eight years after Nancy's parents
had first petitioned the court for permission to withdraw her life-
sustaining medical treatment, to find that the "clear and convincing"
standard of proof had been satisfied.17
The decision by the Supreme Court gives each state the author-
ity to determine what evidence will or will not be sufficient before
life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn from an incompetent
patient. Although the Court held that a state could require the
heightened evidentiary standard,1 8 it did not preclude states from
employing the more common method of "substituted judgment."t 9
The Court noted that:
[M]any courts which have adopted some sort of substituted
judgment procedures . . ., whether they limit consideration of
evidence to the prior wishes of the incompetent individual, or
whether they allow more general proof of what the individual's
decision would have been, require a clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof for such evidence."0
Even though a clear and convincing burden of proof is set forth
as the evidentiary standard in the above language, the standard ac-
tually varies depending on whether the court uses the substituted
judgment,21 best interests, 2 or clear and convincing standard.23 This
14. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420-21 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). Missouri
conceded that its "unqualified" State interest in the preservation of life was contrary to the
decisions reached by the majority of courts which hold that the patient's right to refused medi-
cal treatment almost always outweighs the state's interest in preserving life. See id.
15. Id. at 424.
16. Id. at 426.
17. The Death of Nancy Cruzan, (PBS television broadcast, March 1992).
18. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
19. Id. at 2855; see infra notes 71-104 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 2854-55.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 73-106.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 107-19.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 120-58. Often courts will use the "clear and con-
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Comment will compare and contrast these three methods used by the
states. Parts I through IV will provide the historical background of
"right to die" cases and will also show what statutory protections are
available to the public. Parts V through VII will examine the three
evidentiary standards. Although each standard has both advantages
and disadvantages,24 the clear and convincing burden of proof re-
quired by only a few states has serious flaws 25 that allow the courts
to arbitrarily substitute their own judgment for what the patient
would desire if competent. As a result, those who know the incompe-
tent patient best are precluded from offering evidence as to what
they believe would be the most appropriate medical decisions.
The chance that the incompetent's wishes will not be honored
greatly increases when the court ignores evidence from family and
friends who know the patient well. Part VIII will examine the clear
and convincing standard in light of the United States Supreme
Court decision of Cruzan.
II. History
A. The Results of Advanced Medical Technology
The "right to die" did not become a prevalent legal issue until
the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Quinlan26 approxi-
mately sixteen years ago. Rapid advances in medical technology ex-
plain the marked increase in right to die cases. Courts are aware of
the dilemmas often caused by the new medical technology. 7 Specifi-
cally, courts are aware that patients suffering from serious illnesses
can now be sustained by medical treatment for indefinite periods of
time.2"
vincing language," but will apply this burden of proof to the substituted judgment or best
interests test. A reader must determine whether "clear and convincirg" refers to the burden of
proof or the actual evidentiary standard. New York and Missouri appear to be the only states
which apply "clear and convincing" as the evidentiary standard.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 106, 115-17.
25. See infra p. 21.
26. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert, denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
27. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1220 (N.J. 1985). "As scientific advances make it possible for us to live longer than ever
before, even when most of our physical and mental capacities have been irrevocably lost, pa-
tients and their families are increasingly asserting a right to die a natural death without undue
independence on medical technology or unreasonably protracted agony." Id,; see In re L.H.R.,
321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (finding that society is unable to deal with ethical problems
created by modern medical technology because the changes are occurring at such a rapid
rate).
28. See In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 294-95 (I1. 1989) ("Hopelessly or
terminally ill patients who in the past would have met with a swift end, now find medical
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Although these advances in medical technology provide invalua-
ble benefits for the patient with a curable illness, the results can be
quite different when the patient is terminally ill or in a persistent
vegetative state. 29 Families and physicians responsible for making
the patient's medical decisions must decide whether to keep the pa-
tient alive with life-sustaining medical treatment 0 or allow the pa-
tient to die naturally. Disagreements that arise in the decision-mak-
ing process are the primary reason why "right to die" disputes have
been thrust upon the legal system.
B. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
1. Common Law.-Before courts could reach the issue of ap-
propriate evidentiary standards, they first had to determine whether
a patient had any right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Courts have held that the right to refuse medical treatment has its
foundation in either common law31 or constitutional principles.
32
A patient's common law right to refuse medical treatment stems
from the principle established over a century ago that persons should
be free to control their own bodies.33 As Justice Cardozo stated in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,34 "[elvery human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body . . .- 5
In more recent times, the doctrine of informed consent has been
invoked to protect a person's right to determine whether medical
treatment will or will not be provided.3" The doctrine of informed
consent centers around a patient's ability to understand the risks in-
volved in administering the medical treatment and requires a patient
science can sustain them, near the threshold of death, but not yet across it."). Patients can
remain in a persistent vegetative state for twenty years. The factors which affect the duration
of time that the patient will be sustained depends on: 1) age; 2) economic, family and institu-
tional factors that can affect the quality of care; 3) the natural resistance of the body: and 4)
relevant views on the propriety of stopping treatment. See Gasner, supra note 7, at n.35 (cita-
tion omitted).
29. See supra note 3.
30. See Arizona Medical Treatment Decisions Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
3201(4) (1986). "[Llife-sustaining procedure means a medical procedure which utilizes
mechanical or other artificial methods to sustain, restore or supplant a vital function. The term
does not include medication or procedures necessary to alleviate pain." Id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 33-39.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
33. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
34. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
35. Id. at 93.
36. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1222 (N.J. 1985).
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to make a voluntary, rational decision to consent to the treatment.3
Though logic suggests that a patient must be capable of rational de-
cision-making in order to exercise informed consent, a patient does
not necessarily lose the authority to exercise informed consent
merely because the patient is rendered incompetent. a8
Nevertheless, the doctrine of informed consent is more trouble-
some to apply when an incompetent patient is involved. This is so
because the incompetent patient lacks cognitive and decisionmaking
ability.39 Those who are not competent to make their own medical
decisions must necessarily have another do so on their behalf. Courts
that intervene at this juncture must determine who shall have the
authority to make the necessary medical decisions for the incompe-
tent patient. After determining who the decision maker should be,
the court may have to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to
allow the decision maker to withdraw or refuse life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment on behalf of the incompetent patient.
2. The Constitutional Right to Privacy.-Several jurisdictions
which have addressed the right to die issue have: held that patients
have a constitutional right of privacy.40 In the process of finding such
a constitutional right, several courts41 have discussed the "penum-
bra"42 theory set forth by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.4 a The seminal case of In re Quinlan"' held that the right of
37. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en bane) (quoting Sidney
H. Wanzer et al., The Physicians Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 955, 957 (1984):
The patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision
must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient must have a
clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment alterna-
tives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of the nature of the dis-
ease and prognosis.
Id.
38. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987); In re Estate of
Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 297 (II1. 1989); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222.
39. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
40. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 924 (Fla.
1984); Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427; In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (N.J. 1987); In re
Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987) (citing In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738,
742 (Wash. 1983)), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (1988).
41. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 682; McConnell v. Beverly Fnterprises, 553 A.2d 596,
601 (Conn. 1989); Bludworth, 452 So.2d at 924; In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga.
1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424; In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987).
42. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 681. "The right to privacy emanates from the penumbra of
specific guarantees of particular amendments to the Constitution." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (granting right of privacy to married couples who choose to use
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privacy "is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances." '45 The patient's con-
stitutional right may remain intact even in situations when the re-
fusal of the medical treatment could result in the patient's death.4"
In Cruzan,47 the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether such a constitutional right exists, but its conclusions were
far from definitive. Based on precedent, the Court suggested that it
could be "inferred" '48 that a "competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
... ," Instead of expressly stating that the right exists, the major-
ity "assumed""0 that a competent person would have a constitutional
right to refuse artificial hydration and nutrition.5 1 Justice O'Connor,
concurring, found that the Due Process Clause52 does guarantee a
liberty interest in the right to refuse medical treatment.5" Although
Justice O'Connor found that the right exists, the majority offers no
clear answers. The states are still left to determine the extent of a
person's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
III. Countervailing State Interests
Notwithstanding whether a state finds that an incompetent's
right to refuse medical treatment rests on common law or constitu-
tional principles, the patient's rights must be balanced against coun-
tervailing state interests.54 The four controlling state interests most
commonly recognized by the courts are preservation of life, protec-
tion of third parties, prevention of suicide, and protection of the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical community.
55
Courts have recognized that a state's interest in the lreservation
of life is the most compelling interest and deserves the most defer-
contraceptives).
44. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub norn. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
45. Id. at 663; accord Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977).
46. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (N.J. 1985).
47. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).




52. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857-58 (1990).
53. Id.
54. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d
404, 411 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
55. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683; In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 299 (111.
1989); Farrdll, 529 A.2d at 411 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985)).
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ence. 56 Those cases involving the need to protect third parties most
often involve medical treatment necessary to save the life of a parent
who has minor children.57 Several courts have held that refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment cannot be equated with an attempt
to commit suicide.58 The state's interest in protecting the integrity of
the medical community is not significant in light of the fact that the
medical community itself has acknowledged that, under certain cir-
cumstances, it is not unethical to discontinue life-sustaining
treatment.59
The State of Missouri, ignoring both public sentiment 0 and the
majority of jurisdictions addressing the validity of the state interests,
is the sole state to assert an "unqualified" interest s' in the preserva-
tion of life.62 The Supreme Court upheld the State's unqualified in-
terest and stated that, "[W]e think a State may properly decline to
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individ-
ual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the pres-
ervation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the individual."63 By definition, unqualified means
56. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewic,, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass, 1977) ("[lIt is clear that the most significant of the asserted State interests is that of
the preservation of human life."); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985); In re
Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983), modified, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d
1371 (Wash. 1984). Two courts have found that the state's interest in the preservation of life
weakens when treatment is only prolonging the life of a patient who has an incurable condi-
tion. See Saikewicz, 370 NE.2d at 425-26; Coyler, 660 P.2d at 743; cf. In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert, denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
57. Farrell, 529 A.2d at 412 (finding that courts have required that medical treatment
be administered to a parent of a minor child if the child will suffer emotional and financial
loss) (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225).
58. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.l 1; Farrell, 529 A.2d at 411; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224; In re
Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 n.6 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). But see
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2861 (1990). "Starving oneself to
death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the common law definition of
suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to
'put[t] an end to his own existence.' " Id. (Scalia, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
59. The American Medical Association issued the following statement on March 15,
1986:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible
and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis and
with the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the patient,
it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical treatment.
See In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 295-96 (I11. 1989).
60. See supra note 13.
61. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
62. Id. at 420-21 (acknowledging that the majority of states find that a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment outweighs the state's interest in preserving life).
63. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990).
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"absolute,"" and this indicates that a patient's right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment will virtually never outweigh the state's
interest in preserving life.
IV. Statutory Protections
Many states have enacted legislation to protect an individual's
right to refuse medical treatment. The most common statutory pro-
tection adopted by the states is "living will" legislation. 8 Another
protection offered by over half of the states66 is the durable power of
attorney. 67 A durable power of attorney allows individuals to desig-
nate who will be responsible for making their health care decisions if
they become incompetent.68 A minority of states 9 have adopted
64. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1324 (2d ed. 1982).
65. Although the subject of living wills is beyond the scope of this Comment, the general
purpose of living wills is to allow an individual to set forth in a document his or her wishes
regarding life-sustaining medical treatment. See Gasner, supra note 7, at 14. The following
states have passed living will statutes: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§
18.12.010 to .100 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (Supp. 1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to
7194.5 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1991);
CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
2501-2509 (1983 & Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Michie
1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502 to -4509
(Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2, paras. 701 to 708 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); KY. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 311.622 to
.644 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.01 to .17 (West Supp. 1992);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055
(Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1991); 1992 NEB. LAWS 671;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.535 to .690 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137H:l to :16 (1990 & Supp. 1991); 1991 N.J. LAWS 201; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-
1 to -10 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-
06.4-01 to -14 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01 to .15 (Anderson Supp. 1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1 to .4; 3101 to 3111 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 127.605 to .650 (1990 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to -13 (Supp. 1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-
101 to -112 (Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001 to .021 (West
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5251 to 5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991
& Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§
35-22-101 to -109 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
66. See Gasner, supra note 7, at 16-17.
67. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847 n.3 (listing states which have passed legislation
authorizing durable powers of attorney).
68. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
69. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 13.26.335, 13.26.344(1) (Supp. 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2500 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE § 21-2205 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1989); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1102, § 804-1 - 804-12 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-625 (Supp.
1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.800
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more specific statutes explicitly authorizing surrogate decision-
making.
70
Although statutory protections can effectively safeguard an in-
dividual's right to refuse medical treatment, their effectiveness is
often diminished because the public may be unaware of their exis-
tence or ready availability. 71 The media attention given to the
Cruzan case may have an impact on public awareness. 7' Death is not
a subject that people confront easily. Thus, when a situation requires
that life-sustaining medical treatment decision be made for a person
rendered incompetent, those individuals responsible for making the
decisions are often left with little, if any, guidance.
If a dispute arises, and the patient has failed to leave specific
directives, judicial determinations may control whether life-sus-
taining medical treatment can be refused or withdrawn. If judicial
intervention is necessary, the court must determine whether the evi-
dence presented will satisfy its standards and whether the court will
allow the withdrawal of the medical treatment.
V. Substituted Judgment Standard
A. In re Quinlan
73
The seminal "right to die" case, cited by courts even today, is In
re Quinlan.7 " At a very young age Karen Quinlan inexplicably
ceased breathing for two extended periods of time.75 Karen never
regained consciousness and was diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state. 76 After Karen's family resigned themselves to the
fact that Karen's condition would not alter, her father requested that
(Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 et seq. (Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §
127.510 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5603(h) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
23-4.10-1 et seq. (1989); TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 3451 et seq. (1989).
70. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847-49 nn.2,4 (listing states that have adopted durable
power of attorney and living will statutes which explicitly authorize the appointment of health-
care proxies).
71. Barber v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("The lack of
general public awareness of the statutory scheme . . . makes this a tool which will all too often
go unused by those who desire it.").
72. See supra note 17.
73. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 653-54.
76. Id. at 654. Although Karen was not "brain-dead" as delined by the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of Harvard Medical School, she required a respirator to assist her in breathing. At-
tempts were made to slowly remove the respirator, but these attempts were unsuccessful. See
id. at 654-55; see also supra note 3 (defining persistent vegetative state).
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the respirator be withdrawn." This request was denied by one of
Karen's physicians,78 and the court was forced to intervene.7 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court gave no weight to statements
Karen made concerning medical treatment that artificially prolongs
a person's life.8 Although it was unclear what Karen would have
desired had she been competent, the court held that the decision-
making should remain primarily within the patient-family-doctor re-
lationship.81 The court established a four-step process82 to determine
whether the request for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
should be honored:
1. The family and guardian of the patient must agree to the
proposed withdrawal;83
2. The responsible attending physicians must conclude that there
is no reasonable possibility that the patient will emerge from the
comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state;8
3. The physicians must conclude that the life-sustaining mea-
sures should be discontinued;8 5 and
4. A consultation with an "ethics committee" '86 or another con-
sultative body must occur to determine that the attending physi-
cians made no mistakes in their analysis. 87
This process permits those individuals most familiar with the patient
to control the decision-making process within the boundaries estab-
lished by the medical profession. This method of allowing the family
and physicians to determine whether the life-prolonging medical
treatment should be withdrawn from the patient has commonly been
referred to as the substituted judgment doctrine. 88
77. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653.
78, In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 664. ("W]e cannot discern her supposed choice based on the testimony of her
previous conversation with friends where such testimony is without sufficient probative
weight.") In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985), later reversed this part of the
Quinlan decision and held that evidence of prior statements made by the incompetent should
be considered. Id.
81. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
82. Id. at 671.
83. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. An ethics committee is a body composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys, and
theologians that review individual circumstances of ethical dilemmas. See id. at 668 (citing
Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAY-
LOR L REV. 6, 8-9 (1975)).
87. Id. at 671-72.
88. Substituted judgment originated over 150 years ago in cases where administrators
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B. The Modern Trend of Substituted Judgment
The majority of courts confronting an individual's right to die
seem to favor substituted judgment. The case of In re Jobes89 pro-
vides a concise summary of how the courts apply substituted
judgment:
Under the substituted judgment doctrine, where an incompe-
tent's wishes are not clearly expressed, a surrogate decision-
maker considers the patient's prior statements about and reac-
tions to medical issues, and all the facets of the patient's person-
ality that the surrogate is familiar with - with, ,of course, par-
ticular reference to his or her relevant philosophical, theological
and ethical values - in order to extrapolate what course of
medical treatment the patient would choose.9"
The court in Jobes explained that the probative value accorded to
prior statements would depend on a variety of factors including the
"remoteness, consistency and thoughtfulness ...and the maturity
of the person at the time of the statements .... .""I The court con-
cluded that prior statements made by Nancy Jobes92 were unrelia-
ble. 3 Upon concluding that her statements were insufficient to estab-
lish her wishes, the court held that the substituted judgment
standard could be utilized by Jobes' remaining family members.94
In re Estate of Longeway95 is one of the most recent decisions
adopting the substituted judgment doctrine. 96 In determining that
would preside over the estate of an incompetent individual. Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) (citing Ex Parte Whitbread in
re Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816)).
89. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
90. Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 443. Although the maturity of the person was considered by the court in
determining the probative value of prior statements, it seems unfair to decrease the value of a
person's beliefs because they are young. In situations where the patient was once competent,
but is unexpectedly rendered incompetent, age should not be a consideration. Individuals
should not be penalized for failing to foresee that they would lose their cognitive abilities.
92. Mrs. Jobes was admitted to a hospital after sustaining severe injuries in an automo-
bile accident in March 1980. She was diagnosed by several physicians as being in a persistent
vegetative state. Mrs. Jobes had made several statements over a number of years to both her
family and friends indicating that she would not want to be sustained by artificial means. See
id. at 437-40, 442-43.
93. Id. at 443.
94. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446 (N.J. 1987).
95. 599 N.E.2d 292 (i11. 1989).
96. Mrs. Longeway suffered a series of strokes which resulted in unconsciousness. Mrs.
Longeway's guardian requested that the gastrostomy tube sustaining her be withdrawn on the
basis that Mrs. Longeway had stated several times that she would want to die naturally in-
stead of being sustained by artificial means. See id. at 293. The court held that two conditions
must be met before evidence could be considered at all. The incompetent patient must be
terminally ill and the patient must be either irreversibly comatose or in a persistent vegetative
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the substituted judgment standard should apply in right to die cases,
the Longeway court used much of the same reasoning set forth ear-
lier by the Jobes court. The court held that even in the extreme situ-
ation, when an individual has expressed no thoughts or beliefs con-
cerning life-sustaining medical treatment, the patient's preference
could still be ascertained. 97 Specific directives were deemed unneces-
sary to meet the evidentiary standards of the substituted judgment
doctrine.98
C. The Importance of Family Relationships
Family relationships play an important role when the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine is used. In re Quinlan99 was the first case to
stress the importance of giving family relationships with the patient
great deference in determining what the incompetent patient would
have desired. 00 Traditional family bonds have been shown great re-
spect by both society and the judicial system.' Family members are
often the people most familiar with the patient's values and way of
life."0 2 Unfortunately, they are often the ones who suffer the greatest
loss when a patient becomes seriously ill.
10 3
Admittedly, problems do arise when applying an evidentiary
standard tailored to the substituted judgment doctrine. Although one
would like to believe that all families share warm, affectionate feel-
ings, such is not always the case. Family members may disagree
about what treatment should be provided to the incompetent pa-
state. Id. at 298.
97. Id. at 299-300 (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (quoting Steven
A. Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, The
Physician and The State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 35, 45-46 (1985)):
Even if no prior specific statements were made, in the context of the individuals
entire prior mental life, including his or her philosophical, religious and moral
views, life goals, values and the purpose of life and the way it should be lived,
and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death, that in-
dividual's likely treatment/non-treatment preferences can bediscovered.
Id.
98. Id. at 300.
99. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
992 (1976), diverged in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
100. Id. at 664 ("The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right [of privacy]
is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment .... ").
101. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-505 (1977).
102. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (finding that family members are in the
best position to make medical decisions for incompetent patients because they have a "peculiar
grasp of the patient's approach to life").
103. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987) (stating that families commonly
exhibit the greatest degree of concern about the welfare of ailing family members) (citing
Steven A. Newman, Treatment Refusal for the Critically IWI, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN.
35, 45 (1985)).
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tient.' 0 4 Other family members may participate in the decision-mak-
ing process with less than honorable motives. 10 5
Though such problems may arise, several states have formulated
methods for resolving them. 106 Although the courts may be forced to
intervene in certain situations, the substituted judgment doctrine
provides a freedom from judicial intervention not offered by more
strict evidentiary standards. If the evidentiary standard is strict, hos-
pitals and physicians will be more cautious about withdrawing life-
prolonging medical treatment. The health-care providers will be
more wary about making decisions because of the heightened eviden-
tiary standard and may request judicial intervention more often in
cases when it is unnecessary. When courts become intertwined in the
decision-making process, the danger exists that judges will miscon-
strue the patient's prior expressions or values. A judge is more likely
to misconstrue what the patient has previously stated than would
someone who knew the patient well. The judge has had no personal
contact with the patient, whereas the family ha; often had a close
relationship with the patient for a considerable length of time. The
likelihood that the patient's wishes will be honored greatly increases
if the decisions regarding medical treatment are left to those individ-
uals who know the patient well. The family usually will be in the
best position to determine the patient's desires.
VI. Best Interests Standard
Although the substituted judgment doctrine is the best method
in cases where the patient was once competent, it is more difficult to
apply when the patient has never been capable of expressing his or
her thoughts.0 7 In response to such complications, courts have devel-
oped a "best interests" standard. 0 8 The best interests standard dif-
104. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926-27
(Fla. 1984) (holding that disagreements between physicians and family members or evidence
of bad intentions or malpractice may require judicial intervention).
105. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990). There will,
of course, be some unfortunate situations in which family members will not act to protect a
patient." Id. (quoting Jobes, 529 A.2d at 447).
106. In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 301 (I11. 19;9) (judge has discretion to
investigate the motives of those individuals who may benefit from the death of the incompetent
if it is necessary); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987) ("Whenever a health-care
professional becomes uncertain about whether family members are properly protecting a pa-
tient's interests, termination of life-sustaining treatment should not occur without the appoint-
ment of a guardian."); see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. Longeway, 599 N.E.2d at 299 (finding that substituted judgment is difficult to ap-
ply in cases where the patient is an infant or life-long incompetent who was never capable of
making statements about refusing life-prolonging medical treatment).
108. The best interests standard has been defined as "[a) decisionmaker [who] decides
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fers from substituted judgment because "objective criteria"109 are
controlling instead of subjective criteria. In re Guardianship of
Grant" relied heavily on the case of In re Conroy"' in setting forth
a list of factors to be considered when determining the best interests
of the patient. These factors include:
Evidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory,
emotional, and cognitive functioning; the degree of pain result-
ing from the medical condition, treatment and termination of
treatment, respectively; the degree of humiliation, dependence,
and loss of dignity probably resulting from the condition and
treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery with
and without treatment; the various treatment options; and the
risks, side effects, and benefits of each of those options.1
1 2
This detailed list assures that the decision maker does not reach a
conclusion to refuse or withdraw life-prolonging treatment before se-
rious consideration is given to many factors. The incompetent's
guardian will often determine the patient's best interests."' If the
guardian is a family member, he or she will be the most familiar
with the incompetent's personality and reactions' 14 toward medical
treatment.
The application of the best interests standard causes more seri-
to consent to or refuse medical treatment for the patient based on what would be in the pa-
tient's best interests, considering 'from an external stance, the needs, risks, and benefits to the
affected person.'" Jobes, 529 A.2d at 457 (citing Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention
in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.U REF. 933, 973 (1985) (footnote
omitted)).
109. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that the objec-
tive criteria should include "relief from suffering, preservation or restoration or functioning
and quality and extent of sustained life") (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 135 (1983)) (footnote omitted).
110. 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988).
111. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The Conroy court set forth two separate tests that are
similar to the "best interests standard - a limited-objective and a pure-objective tests." The
limited-objective test is used when "some trustworthy evidence" exists that the patient would
not want medical treatment to artificially prolong the patient's life, and the decision-maker
feels certain that the burdens of providing the treatment outweigh any benefits the patient may
receive. See id. at 1232. The pure-objective test is employed when no evidence exists as to
what the patient would have desired if competent. The burdens and benefits of the medical
treatment are also balanced under this test but without the benefit of any subjective evidence.
See id. at 1232.
112. Grant, 747 P.2d at 457 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985)).
The majority opinion in Conroy stated that a surrogate decision-maker should have at least as
much medical information as a competent patient would have had before making medical
decisions for an incompetent patient. Id. The medical information included the extensive list of
factors which the Grant court incorporated into its decision.
113. Id. at 457.
114. Id.
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ous problems than substituted judgment. One major flaw of the best
interests standard is that it fails to respect a person's right of self-
determination because of the lack of subjective criteria. 115 Notwith-
standing the factors quoted above, there exists no truly objective cri-
teria for determining precisely when a life is no longer worthy of
being sustained by medical treatment. The principal problem with
the best interests standard is that it, of necessity, assumes that such
objective criteria do exist.11
The thought of one individual making a determination to termi-
nate medical treatment on behalf of another is disconcerting, espe-
cially when no evidence exists as to what the patient's desires would
be if the patient was competent. The alternative is equally dis-
turbing, however. Someone has to be responsible for making the in-
competent patient's medical decisions. If a close family member or
guardian cannot make the determination, responsibility for making
the medical decisions will be delegated to an impersonal third party.
This alternative method is much less satisfactory than permitting a
family member or guardian to make the decisions. An impersonal
third party, such as a judge, is the least able to effectuate the desires
of the patient because the third party has had no personal contact
with the patient.
Even if a patient has been incompetent since birth, those indi-
viduals who have spent extended periods of time with the patient are
most qualified to determine the patient's best interests. Most incom-
petents, such as mentally retarded persons, have developed unique
personalities" 7 even though their mental abilities are limited. Those
persons who have spent the most time with such patient are in a
better position to decide if the burdens of the medical treatment will
outweigh the benefits the patient might receive.
A court or institution having no personal contact with the in-
competent patient is less capable of making an accurate determina-
tion as to what the patient's best interests are. Although the most
difficult issues arise in right to die cases when a person has left no
115. In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 299 (111. 1989). "The problem with the
best interests standard is that it lets another make a determination of a patient's quality of life,
thereby undermining the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of the person upon
which the right to refuse medical treatment stands." Id.
116. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 457-58 (N.J. 1987).
117. Even in cases where a mentally handicapped person has the cognitive ability of an
infant, the individual may have developed certain character traits. Irfants develop certain hab-
its and ways of reacting at a very early stage. The parents learn to become familiar with the
infant's wants and needs because of these habits. Similarly, an incompetent person with a
severely limited intelligence level is still capable of forming some unque personality traits that
enable those most familiar with the person to determine his or her needs.
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subjective evidence of his or her desires, the final determination
should still be made by those who have personal ties to the patient.
The courts should intervene only in situations where the family dis-
agrees118  or the motives of certain family members are
questionable." 9
VII. Clear and Convincing
By excluding evidence proffered by those parties most closely
associated with the patient, those few states 2' that require a "clear
and convincing" standard of evidence will likely fail to honor an in-
competent patient's desires. A comparison of two New York deci-
sions demonstrates the capricious manner in which courts apply the
clear and convincing standard of proof.
A. In re Eichner12'
In re Eichner22 was the first New York case to find that the
clear and convincing standard is appropriate in cases involving re-
quests to discontinue life-prolonging medical treatment. 123 Brother
Fox was eighty-three years old when he suffered a hernia and under-
went corrective surgery. 124 During the surgery, Fox went into car-
diac arrest and experienced severe brain damage. 25 Because Fox
was thereafter incapable of breathing on his own, he was placed on a
respirator and physicians determined that Fox was in a persistent
vegetative state.1 16
The Eichner court held that the clear and convincing standard
was met under the circumstances. 27 Fox had been an active member
of the Society of Mary, a Catholic religious order. 128 After retiring
to a religious community in 1970, Fox made several statements re-
118. See supra note 104.
119. See supra note 105.
120. Only New York and Missouri have adopted a strict "clear and convincing" stan-
dard. Courts may use "clear and convincing" language, but do so in the context of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine or best interests standard. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,
691 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that if a court has toquestion substituted judgment or best interests
of the incompetent, the evidence must be clear and convincing before the court can make a
final determination); In re Estate of Longeway, 599 N.E.2d 292, 300 (I11. 1989).
121. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 72.
124. Id. at 67.
125. Id.
126. In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
127. Id. at 71.
128. Id. at 67.
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garding his feelings about life-sustaining medical treatment. 12 9 The
court found it important that Fox had clearly expressed his wishes;
that he was mature enough to realize the consequences of his state-
ments; that Fox repeated his views shortly before his final hospitali-
zation; and that his remarks were more than casual. 3 0 The court
also considered it important that Fox had specifically expressed an
opinion concerning the particular type of medical treatment he
would refuse.' 3 Fox had focused on the use of respirators as life-
sustaining medical treatment during one of his discussions." 2
B. In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor)13 3
The same New York court held that petitioner failed to meet
the clear and convincing standard in In re Westchester County Med-
ical Center (O'Connor).34 After suffering from a stroke, Mrs.
O'Connor became mentally incompetent and was. unable to intake
nutrition and hydration without medical assistance. 3 5 Judicial inter-
vention became necessary when Mrs. O'Connor's daughters decided
that their mother would not want a nasogastric tube inserted to pro-
vide her with sustenance.33 The hospital disagreed with the daugh-
ter's decision and applied to the court for authority to insert the
tube."'
Mrs. O'Connor's daughters, along with a close friend of Mrs.
O'Connor, offered evidence of Mrs. O'Connor's prior statements re-
garding life-prolonging medical treatment.' 38 Mrs. O'Connor had
stated to her close friend on at least three occasions that she would
not want to be kept alive by life-sustaining medical treatment.3 9
Mrs. O'Connor had also informed her daughters several times that
she would not want her life prolonged by artificial means if she be-
129. Fox first expressed his views in 1976 when he and members of the religious com-
munity discussed the moral issues surrounding the Quinlan case. During this discussion, Fox
stated that "he would not want any of this 'extraordinary business' done for him under those
circumstances." A few months before becoming incompetent, Fox repeated his sentiments that
he would not want his life prolonged by such measures if his condition was hopeless. Id. at 68.
130. Id. at 72.
131. In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
132. Id. at 68.
133. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 608.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 610-11
(N.Y. 1988).
139. Id. at 610-11. Mrs. O'Connor specifically stated that she would not want to lose her
dignity before she died, that nature should be allowed to take its course, and that it was wrong
to keep people alive by artificial means when there is no chance of improvement. Id.
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came ill and unable to care for herself.140
The court examined the evidence presented in light of the clear
and convincing standard enunciated in In re Eichner."' The court
discussed what evidence was necessary to satisfy the burden of proof
and held that the clear and convincing standard "requires proof suf-
ficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the cir-
cumstances like those presented." ' The court further held that the
trier of fact must find that the patient's earlier statements were suffi-
ciently serious so as to diminish the possibility that the patient ex-
perienced a change of beliefs in the interim between the time the
earlier statements were made and the onset of incompetence.
14 3
After setting forth the requirements for meeting the burden of
proof, the court analyzed the evidence in Mrs. O'Connor's case."4'
The court focused on two specific factors in determining that the
evidence was insufficient. First, the court found that Mrs.
O'Connor's earlier statements were merely reactions to other pa-
tients' prolonged deaths.1 45 The court dismissed her earlier state-
ments indicating an unwillingness to be dependent on her family as
little more than typical reactions of a person of advanced age who
has grown increasingly reflective upon her life. 46 Second, the court
determined that Mrs. O'Connor had never specifically considered
medical treatment similar to the medical treatment 14 7 she needed.
The court concluded that the artificial nutrition and hydration
should be continued because petitioners failed to sustain the burden
of proof.1 48
140. Id. at 611. Mrs. O'Connor first expressed her wishes to her older daughter in 1967
after Mr. O'Connor was hospitalized with cancer. The last discussion occurred after Mrs.
O'Connor was hospitalized for a heart attack. She told her daughter how happy she was to be
out of the hospital and would not want life-sustaining treatment administered in the future. Id.
141. Id. at 613.
142. Id. at 614.
143. In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 614
(1988).
144. Id.
145. Id. The court also held that even though Mrs. O'Connor's views were expressed
consistently over the years, this by itself was not demonstrative of a "seriousness of purpose
necessary to satisfy the 'clear and convincing' evidence standard." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 666 (N.Y.
1988).
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C. The Arbitrary Nature of the Clear and Convincing Standard of
Proof
The Eichner and O'Connor cases demonstrate the arbitrariness
inherent in the application of the clear and convincing standard. In
Eichner, Fox made his statements in a discussion held with members
of his religious community.149 The court found these discussions suf-
ficiently solemn to convey Fox's serious intentions. 150 On the con-
trary, though testimony was presented indicating that Mrs.
O'Connor was a very religious woman, 51 the court deemed her re-
marks to be "casual." '52 There is no justification for a finding that
Mrs. O'Connor's convictions were less serious than those of Fox. Al-
though it is true that Fox communicated his thoughts in a more for-
mal atmosphere, Mrs. O'Connor should not be penalized for her fail-
ure to engage in more formal discussions concerning her right to
refuse medical treatment. It is further noteworthy that the court dis-
regarded the fact that Mrs. O'Connor expressed her convictions to
several people over a number of years.
53
The court in Eichner was more amenable to finding that the
burden of proof had been satisfied because Fox had expressed his
views regarding a particular medical treatment markedly similar to
the treatment he ultimately received in his incompetent state.
54
Mrs. O'Connor's statements, however, were given less weight by the
court because her statements lacked any specific reference to the sort
of medical treatment, artificial hydration and nutrition, 55 she ulti-
mately received. 5 6 It is inappropriate for an individual's inability to
predict future illness or required medical treatment to work to that
individual's jeopardy.
Most people, like Mrs. O'Connor, lack the foresight to delineate
those medical treatments they would not wish to have administered
in an effort to artificially sustain life. There is no reason to believe
that Mrs. O'Connor's statements1 57 were any less credible than Fox's
statements, 5 8 or that she was any less serious than Fox. The court,
149. In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
150. Id. at 72.
151. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 611.
152. Id. at 614.
153. In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 614 (N.Y.
1988).
154. In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
155. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 615.
156. Id. at 615.
157. See supra notes 139-40.
158. See supra note 129.
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however, arbitrarily decided what evidence should or should not be
given weight. In so doing, the court in O'Connor ignored testimony
by those who could most accurately provide insight into Mrs.
O'Connor's desires. The court based its decisions on its own values
instead of Mrs. O'Connor's values.
VIII. The Cruzan Case
A. The Missouri Decision
Missouri is the only state, other than New York, that refuses to
consider any evidence outside of the incompetent patient's prior
statements.' 59 Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in a single car acci-
dent in January of 1983.160 Physicians estimated that Nancy had
suffered deprivation of oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes. 6 ' Al-
though Nancy initially showed some signs of improvement, 62 efforts
to rehabilitate her failed and she remained in a persistent vegetative
state' 63 receiving hydration and nutrition from a gastrostomy tube.6
Nancy's parents were appointed co-guardians and asked the em-
ployees of the hospital to cease providing artificial nutrition and hy-
dration. The employees of the hospital did not honor their request.'6 5
The parties sought judicial intervention in order to resolve the dis-
pute. The court found that the clear and convincing standard of
proof was not met.' 6 While it was certain that Nancy would not
regain any cognitive abilities, but would instead remain in a persis-
tent vegetative state, the court refused to consider her prognosis as a
factor.'6 7 The court concluded that "a diminished quality of life does
not support a decision to cause death."'6 8
Nancy's family urged that providing artificial hydration and nu-
trition is an invasive procedure.'6 9 The court summarily rejected this
contention on the ground that the gastrostomy tube had already been
inserted. 70 The court found that merely keeping the tube in place
was not invasive.1 7 ' The major flaw with the court's analysis on this
159. See supra note 120.
160. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
161. Id. at 411.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 3.
164. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
165. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
166. Id. at 426-27.
167. See id. at 422.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
171. Id. at 422-23.
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1992
point is apparent. Nancy's parents were now being penalized for con-
senting to the insertion of the tube in the first place. When the con-
sent to insert the tube was given by Nancy's parents, there was still
hope that Nancy might recover.'17  Under the court's analysis con-
cerning insertion of the gastrostomy tube, families placed in the
same position as Nancy's family may not be as willing to agree to
treatment if they are fearful that their decision will be irrevocable if
the treatment fails. As a result, treatment may be denied in cases
where there is a chance, albeit a slight chance, that the treatment
could improve the incompetent patient's condition.
The court gave no weight to statements 173 Nancy made to her
roommate to the effect that Nancy would not want to be sustained
by life-prolonging medical treatment. 174 The court found that such
statements were merely reactions to other patients' medical
traumas, 175 and that such statements were only casual 176 and gen-
eral. 177 The court's analysis on this point was very similar to that of
the New York court in O'Connor when it determined that Mrs.
O'Connor's statements did not meet the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof.178 It is further noteworthy that Nancy's family and
friends testified that Nancy would not want to ie maintained in a
persistent vegetative state. That testimony was disregarded on the
basis that only Nancy's prior sentiments were determinative. 79 The
Missouri Supreme Court vindicated the state's interest in the preser-
vation of life, and found that the clear and convincing standard was
not satisfied.8 0
B. The 'United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court. However, the decision 'leaves state legisla-
tures and courts responsible for determining what evidentiary stan-
172. Id. at 422.
173. Nancy had stated that she "would not want to continue her present existence with-
out hope as it is." Id. at 424.
174. Id.
175. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 144-45, 151 and accompanying text.
179. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426 (finding that evidence offered as to Nancy's wishes did
not meet the clear and convincing standard of proof and her parerts could not exercise their
substituted judgment for Nancy); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2853 (1990) (finding that most states do not allow oral testimony concerning a patient's
wishes in situations where the consequences are much less serious).
180. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
RIGHT TO DIE
dard will apply in "right to die" cases."' The Court held that Mis-
souri was not violating any constitutional provisions by requiring
that evidence of the incompetent patient's desires be proved by clear
and convincing evidence.182 The states are permitted to use this
heightened evidentiary standard for the purpose of protecting the in-
competent patient against "potential abuses."' 8 Unfortunately, the
Court failed to note that states with less strict evidentiary standards
have equally effective methods of protecting the incompetent pa-
tient."8 " The states that utilize the substituted judgment standard re-
quire judicial intervention in situations where the family disagrees or
the motives of the decision-maker are questionable. 5
The Court noted that most states do not consider oral testimony
about a person's wishes in cases where the transactions are of much
less significance than they are in right to die cases.'8 6 The Court
discussed statutes requiring wills to be in writing and statute of
fraud provisions to demonstrate this point.8 7 The Court erred,
though, by failing to acknowledge that a person's values, beliefs and
lifestyle play a crucial role if courts are to accurately determine a
patient's desires. These values and beliefs are most often expressed
through oral declarations. If courts ignore the oral testimony from
those relatives and friends most familiar with the patient, any deci-
sion regarding life-sustaining medical treatment will rest on an indi-
vidual judge's own system of values and beliefs. Due to the fact that
the judges have had no prior contact with the incompetent patient,
they will have to rely upon their own interpretations of the incompe-
tent patient's desires to determine if the burden of proof is met.
IX. Conclusion
A "right to die" case, by its very nature, raises extremely per-
sonal issues. The responsibility for resolving such issues should not
fall upon the courts unless circumstances absolutely demand judicial
intervention. When the court becomes involved in determining an in-
competent patient's wishes, there exists the inevitable risk that the
court will inappropriately impose its own value judgments upon the
incompetent patient. If the goal is to accurately ascertain the true
181. See generally Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2854.
184. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
186. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853-54 (1990).
187. Id.
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desires of the incompetent patient, logic demands that the court con-
sider all evidence bearing on the issue, including the testimony of
those closest to the patient.
The clear and convincing standard is ill-suited for accurate judi-
cial resolution of right to die cases. Under this standard, the court
must limit its consideration to the poorly articulated, or perhaps non-
existent, earlier statements of the now incompetent patient. Testi-
mony of those with the closest personal ties to the patient is ignored.
Such a standard invites the court to arbitrarily impose its own value
judgments upon the patient. Young people, like Nancy Cruzan, who
never clearly articulated their beliefs concerning the sustaining of
life by artificial means are left to remain in a persistent vegetative
state.
The substituted judgment doctrine188 best effectuates the inten-
tions of an incompetent patient. Employment of this doctrine permits
the court to consider the testimony of those who best know the pa-
tient. Such testimony might include reference to the incompetent pa-
tient's specific beliefs concerning the sustaining of life by artificial
means, but it need not.' 89 Though the incompetent patient's specific
directives should be accorded the greatest weight, in the absence of
such specific directives the court should be permitted to evaluate all
evidence bearing on the true wishes of the patient. 90 In short, if the
circumstances demand judicial intervention, application of the sub-
stituted judgment doctrine increases the likelihood that the court will
reach a decision close to the true desires of the incompetent patient.
At the same time, application of the substituted judgment doctrine
substantially lessens the risk that the court will inappropriately
thrust its own value judgments upon the incompetent patient.
Kristen L. Beebe
188. See supra notes 73-105 and accompanying text.
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190. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
